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A MAINTENANCE MODEL FOR K-OUT-OF- N SUBSYSTEMS
ABOARD A FLEET OF ADVANCED COMMERCIAL AIRCRAFT
by
Douglas R. Miller
Proposed highly reliable fault-tolerant reconfigurable digital
control systems for a future generation of commercial aircraft consist
of several k-out-of-'n subsystems. Each of these flight-critical sub-
systems will consist of n identical components, k of which must be
functioning properly in order for the aircraft to be dispatched. Failed
components are recoverable; they are repaired in a shop. Spares are in-
ventoried at a main base where they may be substituted for failed compo-
nents on planes during layovers. Penalties are assessed when failure
of a k-out-of-n subsystem causes a dispatch cancellation or delay.
A maintenance model for a fleet of aircraft with such control systems
is presented. The goals are to demonstrate economic feasibility and to
optimize. (This is a preliminary report of ongoing research.)
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1. Introduction
This memorandum is a preliminary report about ongoing research
and development of_a cost model for maintenance/maintainability of pro-
posed highly reliable fault-tolerant reconfigurable digital control
systems aboard a future generation of commercial aircraft.
Fault-tolerant digital control systems will allow for more efficient
fuel usage, longer fatigue life, and bad weather operation on future air-
craft. It is necessary to check that the savings so generated will not
be offset by the increased initial costs, maintenance costs and penalties
due to dispatch criticality of such control systems; in other words, is
the system economically feasible? To this end, a model is developed to indi-
cate, prior to actually using the system, the economic impact of maintaining
jl	 such a control system. This paper presents such a maintenance model and
suggests ways to analyze it.
The advanced avionics controlsystems under consideration are en-
{	 visioned as consisting of several types of components, each replicated
several times to achieve fault-tolerance and high system reliability.
Components will include CPU's, memories, busses, input-output units, sen-
sors, actuators, and possibly additional units, depending on the particular
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architecture under consideration. (Two such systems are currently in
the development stage: the SIFT computer of Stanford Research Institute
and the FTMP of Charles Stark Draper Laboratories.) In general, let us
i
Gay there are s types of components: nl of type 1,..., ns of type s.
The minimum number of replicates of each type necessary to perform certain
computing loads will be given by a performance model of the computer/control
system. If the system consists of this number of replicates and suffers a
failure, it will no longer be able to perform all its functions. Thus for
system reliability considerations additional replicates of each type of
component shall be included in the system. A reliability model in con-
junction with the performance model will give, among other things, the
minimuf number of replicates of each type of component required for re-
liable operation of the system; a typical reliability constraint will be
for the probability of catastrophic failure to be less than 10-9 	 For
example, it may require kl replicates of component type 1, k,, of type
2, etc. Presumably the Federal Aviation Agency (FAA) will adopt these
k-values for the minimum dispatch complement of functioning components
in the system. One almost certain result of a maintenance model will be
that an economically optimal system, from a maintenance point of view, will
F
consist of more than the minimum dispatch complement of components, i.e.,
n. > k. . Thus indesigning the system, maintainability must be considered
1	 1
i
{	 in addition to meeting a minimum reliability constraint. This fact is it
l
lustrated by a greatly simplified example in Appendix A. An optimal system
Iis obtained by adding extra replicates of some components but not others;
the decision is dictated by the mean lifetime of the components, the cost
of the components, and financing considerations.
In general, then, we have a system consisting of n i replicates
1!
of component i , i=1,2,...,s	 If fewer than ki are functioning properly,
then the system cannot be dispatched. Thus, the system can be modelled as
s k-out-of-n subsystems in series configuration, [1]. The goal of the
maintenance operation is to minimize system failure,(nondispatch) by
ensuring that there are always at least k  good copies of component type
i=1,2,...,s , in the system. Exponential lifetimes are assumed.
2
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Maintenance of this system is supported by line maintenance centers
located at some of the cities served by the airline; spares will be provi-
sioned at these centers. Also supporting the maintenance operation will
be one repair shop with a certain repair-rate capacity. Whenever enough
failures accumulate to prevent dispatch, the plane is grounded and un-
scheduled maintenance must be performed; otherwise, the maintenance is
performed during scheduled overnight stops at line maintenance centers.
No preventive maintenance is performed.
Our goal is to predict the costs incurred in maintaining such an
avionics control system. Once an entire system is specified, i.e., the
detailed computer architecture and its maintenance support system, many
of the costs can be incorporated into a total cost function in a straight-
forward way; for example, cost of spares, cost of repairmen, and overhead
costs for the line maintenance center. Any such fixed costs are simply
added together. However, costs which are incurred randomly due to events
such as flight delays or cancellations, diversions, late arrivals, etc.,
cannot be included in the total cost of operating the system unless the
long run average frequency of such events is known or can be predicted.
Because such systems have never been flown, such frequencies are unknown
and must be calculated from a probability model. This brings us to the pur-
pose of this paper: namely, to find an analytically tractable model which
approximately describes the stochastic behavior of the above control system
and supporting maintenance activity.
f	 The time-dependent behavior of the system is fairly complicated.
The state space consists of billions of points. Analysis appears impossible.
^.
To circumvent this apparent difficulty, we shall break the large problem
1	 into a number of smaller ones which interface with one another. We 'shall
"uncouple" in three ways.
1. We shall treat one type of component at a time. This gives s
separate processes which correspond to k,-out-of-n, systems
1	 1
which have failures and undergo repair.
2. We shall break the total operation of one of these k-out-of-n
systems into suboperations for example, (i) operation of the
- 3 -
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components over the airline route structure, lii) provisioning
of spares at line maintenance enters, (iii) operation of the
repair shop, and (iv) acquisition and inventorying of nonrecov-
erable subcomponents. Each'of these suboperations can be mod-
elled by itself: (i) a birth-and-death process, ('ii) an allo-
cation problem, (iii) a cyclical machine repair operation, and
(iv) an inventory problem. Steady-state behavior can be deter-
mined for each suboperation. We shall use this to approximate
the steady-state behavior of the entire system by analysis of
the interfaces between the suboperations. An example of un-
coupling queueing networks is that of Jackson queues [7].
3. We shall consider economic penalties resulting from poor main-
tenance (nondispatchability) separately from economic penalties
resulting from unreliability, i.e., problems arising on a plane
which met dispatch requirements at the start of the flight leg.
Given a certain control system and its supporting maintenance system,
we can then determine the approximate rate of occurrence of certain random
events related to maintenance and reliability. The costs incurred by these
events will generally depend upon where and when they occur in the airline.
route. However, over the long run the proportion of events which occur in
one city or flight leg will be proportional to the length of time the plane
spends in that city or flight leg; thus from the route structure and indi-
vidual costs it will be possible to obtain average costs incurred for a
particular random maintenance or reliability event. These can then be
incorporated into general cost equations.
When a cost model is created, the next step will be optimization.
There are various control variables which can be set to values that achieve
economic optimality.
The specific model presented in this paper is a special case of
spares provisioning and control with recoverable units. There exists some
literature in this general area; see References [4], [51, [10], and [14]. The
current situation, however, has two features which, do not appear to have
f
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i
been considered previously in problems of this type: namely, the k-out
of-n feature and the scheduled routine maintenance times. Other general
maintenance models are found in [1] and [11].
The model presented here focuses on maintenance.
	
There are other
factors which should be considered in a complete cost model that are not
addressed here.
1.	 Costs of different hardware designs.
2.	 Costs of software and software maintenance.
Y
3.	 Allocation of components into line replacement units (LRU's).
4.	 Detailed aspects of airline accounting procedures, tax situa- j
tions, etc.	 {
5.	 Savings due to increased fatigue life.
6.	 Juggling the route structure, e.g., "switching tail numbers."
E
7.	 Costs of test equipment.
9
The reader is reminded that the model has many simplifications in it.
	 It
J	 is intended as a prototype to explore and develop methodologies and to gain
insight into modelling one aspect of airline costs.
	 If it is success.-I,
a more realistic extended model can then be developed.
s
2.	 The Model
The following simplified situation is modelled in this paper.
	
The
airline consists of a fleet of
	 N	 planes.	 Aboard each plane there is a
k-out-of-n	 subsystem; for example,
	 n	 identical CPU's in the flight control
system,	 k	 of which are required to be operating for dispatch.
	 It is assumed
that the	 n	 units fail independently of one another; each has an exponential
lifetime with failure rate
	 a	 It is assumed that failures are detected as
they occur; there are no latent failures.
	 Each . of the components is a line
j	 replacement unit (LRU); individual failed components are replaced when the
1
	
opportunity arises.
All routine maintenance of the 	 k-out-of-n
	 system is performed at
one main base.
	 This base includes a line maintenance center, a repair shop,
_ S
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and a pool of spare components. Each plane in the fleet is scheduled for
an overnight stop at the main base at intervals of D days (or equivalently,
T flight hours). At this time failed components are replaced by good com-
ponerts from the spares pool; the failed components are sent to the repair
shop where they are repaired and then added to the spares pool (se'l Figure 1).
There are s spare units; thus at any time there will be a total of s
units in the repair shop and spares pool. There are r repairmen or repair
channels in the repair shop; the repairmen work an eight-hour day from 8:00
a.m. to 5:00 p.m., say. The repair rate per day per repairman is p , i.e.,
the number of units repaired by a repairman in one day has a Poisson distri-
bution with mean u , provided he is kept busy all day. Equivalently, the
repair time for one unit is exponential with rate u .
A spares strategy is specified for dealing with the possibility
that there are insufficient spares in the spares pool to meet demand. Any
demand from a plane whose system has dropped below k functioning units
is considered an "emergency" demand because such a plane cannot be dis-
patched unless a replacement is made. Thus,whenever such a demand is made,
a number of spares sufficient to restore the system to k functioning units
is released if there are any spares available in the spares pool. If such
an event occurs while the plane is away from the main base, the plane is
grounded there until the spare parts are flown out to it; it then continues
on its scheduled flight plan. It greatly simplifies the analysis if only
minimal repairs (restore system to k operating components) are allowed
away from the main base; therefore we shall make that assumption in this
simplified model. The demands made on the spares pool by planes during
their scheduled overnight stop at the main base will be considered "routine."
When the spares pool is low it may not be optimal to fill all such demands.
In general,if a system requests d replacement components and y units
are available in the spares pool, f(d,y) units will be released from the
spares pool. We shall consider two special cases. First, a hoarding level
h is set. All "routine" requests are filled which do not deplete the
spares pool below - h ; other requests are denied: f0(d,y) = d if y-d >
h , = y-h if h < y < h+d , and = 0 if y < h
	 The second spares
strategy will be more general; it is the same as above except that when
- 6 -
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d n-k at least one spare will be released if available: f 1 (d,y) = d
if y-d > h , = y-h if h < y < h+d , = 1 if d = n-k and 1 < y < h
and = 0 if d < n-k and y < h . Let S be a control variable (equal.
to 0 or 1) which corresponds to the two cases above, then
d	 if y-d>h
y-h	 if h < y < h+d
f6 (d, y) =	 d	 if d = n-k, 1 < y < h
0	 if d<n-k	 1 < y < h
0	 if Y < 1 .
It is possible to let 6 equal other values, but restricting it to 0 or
1 will illustrate the method of analysis. Recall that demand from a system
with fewer than k operating components is considered an "emergency" and
thus in the above equation for "routine" demands we do not consider d > n-k
Another consideration in this model is the route structure of the
airline. It is assumed that each of the N planes flies the same schedule
staggered by a one-day time delay so that, in effect, the planes are follow-
ing each other on a path throughout the system, making a complete cycle in
vT hours or vD days, where v is the number of planes scheduled for over-
night stops at the main base each night. We assume that v is an integer;
for example, for the United 747 fleet, v = 1	 In addition to the main base,
the route will consist of several primary bases and secondary bases. While
flying the route a plane cannot be dispatched if fewer than k components
in the k-out-of-n system are functioning. If the system drops below k
functioning units in the course of a flight this fact is noted and the plane
is grounded at its destination until a replacement is made, bringing the
system back to k or more functioning components. The penalty for grounding
at a primary base reflects lost time and the cost of sending a spare from the
main base. The penalty for grounding at a secondary base includes these
factors plus the cost of flying in a maintenance man to make the replacement.
The penalty costs are developed more fully in Sections 4 and 5 of this
treatise; it is assumed there that groundings are distributed statistically
over the route according to the schedule. Thus it is necessary in the
present analysis to keep track only of how many occur. (This is an example
I
i
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The state of the airline and its maintenance support at any time is
described by the number of components functioning in the k-out-of-n sub-
system on each plane and the number of spares in the spares pool; it is an
N+1 dimensional vector. Consider the number of units functioning in a
single k-out-of-n system over the interval [0,T] , i.e., the time in-
terval to complete one cycle of the route, main base to main base. Let
Z(t) equal the number of components of the k-out-of-n system functioning
°	 at time t (accumulated flight time since departure from the main base).
A representative sample path of Z is depicted in Figure 2a, and the cor-
responding approximation to be used in modelling is given in Figure 2b.
It will be much easier to analyze the approximate behavior depicted in
Figure 2b.
The paths in Figures 2a and 2b correspond to the following behavior.
The system is dispatched from the main base with k+3 components of the
k-out-of-n system functioning. The first three failures have no effect on
dispatchability. At time t  a failure occurs reducing the system to k-1
functioning components; it is therefore grounded at the completion of the
flight leg, time t 2	It loses t4 - t2
 flight hours waiting for a spare
and resumes its flight plan at time t 4 . The approximate model (Figure 2b)
assumer instantaneous repair although a penalty will be assessed to corres-
pond to the flight time lost in Figure 2a. This approximation will be con-
servative because it exposes the system to more risk, indeed it is possible
for the approximate system to suffer another failure (at time t 3 ) while
the true system's operation is suspended. At accumulated flight time t5
another failure occurs and before completion of the leg (at t 7 ) a second
failure occurs (at t6 ) ; _after a delay the flight is resumed at t8 . In
the approximation the two failures are assumed to be repaired instantly; a
penalty is assessed for each separately. This will be a conservative approx-
imation because the penalty for two separate events will be greater than the
penalty for one event of two failures; with reliable components the failure
of two in one flight leg will be very unlikely, therefore only a small
error is introduced by this approximation. Another .failure occurs (at t 9 )
- 9 _
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Figure 2.--A sample of the state of the k-out-of-n system process and approximation Z.
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on a flight leg which ends at t10 at an overnight stop where it is
possible to fly in a spare and make the replacement without losing any
flight time. The failure is noted in the approximation in Figure 2b;
the fact of no lost.time will be reflected in the statistical distribution
of failures over the route structure that is presented in Section 4.
Similarly, a failure occurs at time t 11 on the leg terminating at the
main base. This failure occurs in the approximation in Figure 2b; the -
fact that there is no penalty for lost time or grounding will again be
accounted for by statistically distributing the failures over the route
structure in order to assess penalties in Section 4. The approximation
in 'Figure 2b should result in only a very slightly higher cost due to the
j	 small likelihood of its differing greatly from the true behavior in Figure
2a. The process in Figure 2a is a rather complicated birth-and-death pro-
cess which is difficult to treat analytically; however, the process in
v
Figure 2b is much simpler. It is a pure-death process with absorbing state
k ; after being absorbed at time 'T  , its failures occur according to a
Poisson process. The state of the ith plane will be denoted Zi
2,...,N
The number of spares available in the spares pool will be denoted
by Y . There are three distinct activities related to the spares pool:
restocking with output from the repair shop, depletion due to "emergency"
demand (units required to restore subsystems to k operating units), and
t	 depletion due to "routine" demand (requests from planes during scheduled
overnight stops at the main base to increase their number of functioning
units from k or more) Roughly speaking, the first activity takes place
during the day, the second later in the day, and the third at night. It
will be convenient for modelling purposes to apportion the three activities
into nonoverlapping time intervals of morning until evening, evening until
night, and night until the following morning. The size of the spares pool
at these times will be denoted YM , YE  and YN , respectively. A repre-
4
r
	 sentative sample path over several days is depicted in Figure 3, where a
negative value of Y corresponds to unfilled "emergency" demand.
i
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We desire more than one possibility for analyzing this system;
thus,in addition to considering Z  as a process over [0,T], we shall
also divide it up according to time of day. Let Z , Zi , and Z  rep-
resent, respectively, the state of the subsystem on the ith plane when it
is dispatched in the morning, when it completes service for the day (num-
ber of components operating plus the number of emergency demands), and
after emergency repair is made. Note that N equals ZM 	 for the next
day except for a plane remaining overnight at the main base. Let G  equal
the number of groundings (or emergency demands) made during the day by the
ith plane.
The basic probability laws governing the above processes will be
presented in Section 3 and the solution for steady-state probabilities
7
r	 discussed in Section 4.	 Before proceeding we shall summarize the notation.
introduced up to this point.
1	 N planes in the fleet
1 k-out-of-n	 subsystem aboard each plane
n components in the subsystem
k components must be functioning for dispatch,
4
j failure rate per hour per component
1 central line maintenance center (at main base)
T flight hours per plane between scheduled overnight stops at main base
D days per plane between scheduled overnight stops at main base
v - planes visit main base each night for overhaul
g	 1 repairshop
r repairmen at shop
S spare units
u repair rate per day per repairman
h hoarding level of spares pool
i	 8 minimum number of replacements for system with
	 n-k	 failures
Zi (t) number of components functioning aboard ith plane at time
	 t
I	 YM size of spares pool in early morning
YE size of spares pool after restock before emergency demand
I
- 13 -
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Y 	 size of spares pool after emergency demand before routine
demand
Zi	 state of ith plane at first dispatch in morning
Z	 state of ith plane at end of flying day
G 
	
number of groundings of ith plane
Note that vD = N and N/v = D , so the average number of hours flown
each day is T/D vT/N per plane. Actually, the model can easily incor-
porate different flight times each day; t 1 + t2 + t3 + ,.. + t  = T .
For the time being we shall consider only the case where D = N and v = 1
In the above list of variables, n , r , s , h , and 6 are control
variables. They will be set in order to optimize some economic objective
function. In addition to these variables, in Section 5 we shall introduce
the possibility of maintaining buffer spares pools, whose sizes can be con-
trolled, at the primary bases.
3. The Underlying Probability Laws
In this section various transition probabilities and other stochastic
relationships are derived for the Y and Z processes. Various subsets
of these probabilities can be used for different analytic approaches. For
the appropriate background material in probability and stochastic processes,
see References [2], [3], [8], and [13]
3.1 Q0: Z(0) - Z(T)
The quantity Z(0) equals the number of functioning components
aboard a plane when it is dispatched after its overnight stay at the main
base, and Z(T) equals the number of components working when it returns
for its next overnight/maintenance visit to the main base. Thus the transi-
tion Z(0) -+ Z(T) reflects the deterioration of the system in [0,T] ,
recalling that k is an absorbing state. Let Q 0 be the matrix of these
transition probabilities:
14 -
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0
ij 
= PfZ(T)=j I Z(0)-i} .
Q
Thus
0	 ,	 if j > i
0
Q 	 failures out of i in [0,T11 , if i > j > k
P{i-j or more failures in [0,T]} ,	 if i > j = k .
Using the fact that a component with failure rate X will fail with prob-
ability 1 - exp(-XT) in the interval [0,T] yields
0	 ,	 j > i
Q G
	 el( 	-aT i-j (e-AT)j
-	 jl 	
i > j >k
ij
(il\l - e 
XT)'-m (e-'T)mi>j =k
m0=	
J//I
3.2
	 QT : Z(T) -r Z(0)
The transition Z(T) -* Z(0) corresponds to "routine" replacements
of failed components during the scheduled overnight visit to the main base.
If x tailed components are replaced, then Z(0) = Z(T) + x . The number
of failed components replaced depends on three things: the number of
failures in the k-out-of-n system, n - Z(T) ; the number of spares
available in the spares pool, YN ; and the strategy for releasing spares
from the spares pool, f& 	 Thus the transition probabilities for Z(T) to
NZ(0) may depend on the value of Y	 Define
Qij IY _ P{Z(0)=j I Z(T)=i, xl^=y}
It follows that this is actually a deterministic transition,
T	 - ( 1	 if fd(n-i,y)	 j-i
	
Q{a1^	 i
I
wI	
i1
e
	#t-	 4	 ^	 }	 t
i
TM-66502
independent when steady state is achieved.
	 In "light traffic," i.e.,
little demand on or depletion of the spares pool, this approximation
of independence might be reasonable.	 (It is discussed in Section 4.)
Let
N(Y)	 =	 P{YNp	 =y}
be the steady-state marginal probabilities of	 YN 	Assuming independence
of	 Z(T)	 and	 YN
	(i.e., the demands of one plane have little influence
on the distribution of the number of units in the spares pool) gives
^	
T
Qi^ 	 _	 P{Z(0)=j	 Z(T)=i}
Qifly PN(Y)
Y
f
3.3QM:	 ZM -t ( ZE , G)
Suppose a plane starts its flight day with
	 ZM 	good components.	 It
flies for
	 t	 hours, then	 ZE	 is the number of good components at the end of the
3
flight day ( t	 hours).	 It is assumed that emergency replacements prevent
the value of	 ZE
	from falling below k ; 	 G	 equals the number of such
emergency replacements.	 (Note that we are bending the rule about emergency
demands depleting the spares pool at the end of the day, after it has been
0
restocked by the repair shop.	 It is believed that this will not have a
significant effect, as it is only a small perturbation along the time axis.)
i	
The possible values taken by 	 (ZE ,G)	 are depicted in Figure 4.
	
Note
that	 G	 is nonzero only when	 ZE = k	 Let	 QM
	be the matrix of transition
probabilities for	 ZM -} (ZE,G)
P{(ZE,G)=(J,g)
	
(	 ZIf i}	 •
QM,
y
(J gig)
First consider the case	 i >	 > k
	
G = 0
c	 d
16 - t
.,^
j
1
1
3
^
_.. Am
i.
7, ^m AOL
TH-66502
4?Y
Figure 4.--State space of (Z G)	 p
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M E_	 _	 M
-	
P{Z -j, G-0	 Z =i).Qi ^ (j . 0 )i;
=	 P{i-j failures out of i in (Q,t])
I =	 P{j survivors out of i in [0,t])
j
i
( ') ( e-Xt ) j
	 ( 1 - e Xt)i-j
{
-
Now consider the case i > j = k	 In this case we shall compute 	 Qr1
i
by conditioning over Tk , the absorption time by state
	 k	 given that
Z1^S
i
Tk	 =	 inf(t	 Z(t)=k'	 .
The distribution of Tk j i 	 is derived by noting that it is the time until
the (i-k) th failure, thus'
{{
Tk 1Z =i
=	 P{k or fewer survivors in [0,t])
(')(e-Xt)?
J=Q
The conditional, densit y= of	 Tk	 given
	
Zri=i	 i5
a
f	
(t)
k 
	
l- e 
Xt i-j-1-xt( ) Xe-jXt (	 )	 (	 jTk ^ Z [.i j=o j
Returning to	 QM	 and using a conditional probability argument:
	 for
g ? 1 ,	 i > k .
— 18
(e
Qi,(k,g) = 
PTZF--k, G=g I ZMil
t
	
= f PfG--g I T k =s1f	 Wds
0	
Tk 1 
Z,^=i
ft e-kX(t-s) [kX(t-s)]g f	 (s)ds
0	 g!	 Tk1Z M=j
k X (i) .-kXt (kX)g
j=0	 g!	 m--O
x
 ji 
t (t-s) lg e Xs(k-j -m-' )ds- j ft (t-s) g e Xs(k-j-m) ds
0	 0
The above is obtained via substitution and the Binomial theorem. This
expression can be evaluated by noting that
ft (t-s) g e'sds = t g+1 eat fl ug e'-(at)u du
0	 1 0
and that
9 Su
u e- du = g! e,	 (9+1)
0
In actual applications it will be possible to truncate the values of g
to perhaps g < 2 or 3 because with reliable components it will be very
unlikely to have more than one or two failures in one day's flight time.
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Finally consider the case i = k
4k,(k,g) _ P{ZE=k, G=g ZM=k}
P{g events of Poisson process in [O,t]'
= e kat kat) g .
g!
I T	 1T3.4 rk ^ z = E ' Rk ( Z(0)=z,
Let Rk be the random variable equal to the proportion of time
during [0,T] that Z(t) equals k . This is the time when the k-out-
of-n system is susceptible to a failure which causes an "emergency."
RT
 = (T-T)+JT
	
_i	 k
t	 +
where Tk is the passage time defined in 3.3 and x 	 max(O,x) .
rk
,z
 = E(RT 	Z(0)=z)
= T E ((T-Tk ) + Z(0)=z f
T
i	
T I (T-t)dFT
	
0	 k
IZ(0)_z(t)
T
= T I FT IZ(0)
_
_Z(t)dt
	
0	
k 
integrating by parts. Using the formula for F	 in 3.3 gives
Tk I Z (0)
r	 .;
- 20 -
J,{
.., ^^;i
	 aj	 n
t	 ,.
^	 F
TM-66502
rT	 =	 1 f 	
k	
Xt' z-m
 m(1z ) (e-Xt )k,z	
T	
- e	
dt
(
m
0	 m=0 
i
=	
1	 kc 	 z	 T	 -Xt
	 -Xt' z-m(e	 (1'm^ - e	 dtT
UmG0
-	 1	
c
k 	z	 fT z-ccm (- 1) i e at (m+i) dt
	
z- m
L	 L
-	
T 
m=0	 m	 0	 i=0	 1	 i
1	 k	 z-m	 i 1- e XT(m+i)	 z -I
	
(-1)T( Z )m 	 G	 a(m+i)	 \	 i	 !'
M=0	 i=0
I^
The steady-state expected proportion of time the
	 k-out-of-n
system is in state
	 k	 will depend on the steady-state distribution
of	 Z(0)	 .	 Let
q0(1)	 =	 P{Z(0)=i}
when the system has reached steady state.
	 Then
1	 '	 _	
g
rk	 E(j	 =	 E((T-Tk)+'/T	 rk	 q0(z)z
z
d
This quantity will be of interest because if we are dealing with components
which fail infrequently, the point process of "emergency" failures will be
a	 approximately a Poisson process with rate proportional to
	 rk .
U
3.5	 mz (t) = E(G(t)	 I	 Z(0)=z)
Let	 G(t)	 be the cumulative number of "emergency" failures of the
Z _process in the time interval.
	 Calculation of the conditionalexpected
-	 value of
	
G(t)	 is similar to the analysis in 3.4.
	 Conditional on	 Tk =
s < t ,
	 G(t) 	 is a Poisson random variable with mean
	 ak(t-s) ;	 if	 Tk > t
G(t)	 is identically
	 0 , a degenerate form of the Poisson distribution.
I
Thus	 G(t)	 is a mixture of Poisson random variables, the mixing distribution
being	 F	 truncated at
	 t .	 Thus the expected value of	 G(t)	 willTkI Z(0) =z
v
be the same mixture of expected values
f
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mz (t)	 I ak(t
-s)dFT [Z(0)=z
{
0	 k
^k t rk,z
from 3.4. Similarly, if the system has reached a steady-state behavior,
the cumulative expected number of failures will be
m(t) 
= E'G(t))	 mz(t)g0(z) = Xk t r 
z
This quantity will be useful in statistically distributing the "emergency"
failures over the route structure in order to compute the average cost of
an emergency failure.
3.6 PM : Y - -} YE
By an assumption of the model, any change in the spares pool during
the period morning-to-evening is a result of restocking from the repair
shop. Let PM be the matrix of transition probabilities, for 1,j > 0
P J	 P {YE=j ( Y__=i }
= P{repair shop output = j-i + s-i units in shop}
_ R
s-i,s-j
where R is the matrix of transition probabilities for the repair shop:
RQ,m equals the probability that m units will remain in the shop at the
end of the day given that k were in the shop at the beginning of the day.
Let L(t) equal the number in the shop at time t (time is measured in
days). Then
RQ"m	 P{L(1 ) =m I L(0)=P}
The process {L(t), 0 < t < 1 1 is a pure-death process with transition
intensities, for i > 1 ,
P(L(t+Qt) = i.-1 I L(t)=i} = min(i,r)u At
- 22 -
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where time is measured as fraction of working day. Consider, the following
cases.
Suppose i > r ; then define Ti-VT i-2 P .. .9Tr as the first passage
times to states i-1,i-2,.,.,r , respectively:
Ti-1 = inf(t L(t) = i-1) , etc.
If L(0) = i and i > r , then Ti-i has an exponential distribution with
failure rate ru	 Similarly, T 	 TQ+1 has an exponential distribution
with rate rp provided k > r . For k > r , T  has a gamma (ru, i-Q)
distribution and
P{L(1)>R I L(0) =i} = P {T91 > 1} .
4•
A
This is the same probability as for a Poisson process with rate ru thus
Rij must be the same for j > r as for a Poisson process, i.e.,
Rij	 Z{Poisson (ru) process has i-j events in [0,111
-ru (ru)^
-3
(i-j)!	 — —
Now consider the case i > r, j < r
1
Ri9j	 f P{L(1) =j 1 L(0)=i, Tr= t}fTIL(0)=i (t)dtr 
1
P{L(1-t) =j I L(0)=r}f 
TIL(0)=i(t)dtO	 r 
where Tr is the first passage time to state r . The T r has a Gamma
(ru, i-r) distribution with density
f(t) =
	
1	 (ru)	 t	 ei-r i-17-1 -rut	 t > 0
Also
P{L(1- t) =j ( L(0) =r} = 1J )'e-U(1-t))3'1 - e u(1-t)) r j
23 -
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Substituting these expressions into the equation for 
Ri
'j and integrating,
using the equality
_	 i
fl e octtvdt	 v+1 1- e a v
	
! '0	 a	 r=0
yields
j
R	 = ( r) (ru)-r r--1 rm
	 (-l)m e-
u(j+m) - e-pr i-I
-1 [ (r-m-j)uln
i ^ j	 J	 m=0 [(r-m-j)u]i-r 	 n=0	 n.
+-1 r-j 
( jr )
 
u)i-r e-urr
( )	 (i-r)!
Finally, consider the case i < r then
Ri,j = PIL(1)=j I L(0)=i'
( e-") 	11- e- 11(j
We have now given	 R.	 for	 0 < j < i	 the only nonzero values. 	 Re-
'	 f
M
turning to	 PM. 	 it should be noted that 	 YM	 is allowed to take negative
values to reflect unfilled emergency demand. 	 We follow the convention oflr
not returning a failed component to the repair shop before it is replaced
by a good component from the spares pool, thus 	 YM < 0	 implies exactly 	 s
spares in the repair shop and
R	 if	 i > 0
^
s 
_ ins _ 
JM	 _P	 -
i'j 
	 .
Rs,s-j+i	 if	 i	 0
IF 3.7	 PE	YE } YN
The transitions of the spares pool in the evening-to-night period
is assumed due to emergency demand.
	
It is assumed that the system is op-
I ^ timized in such a way that emergency demands are relatively infrequent;
this suggests a Poisson distribution of the number of emergency-demands.
As mentioned in 3.4, the expected number of such demands will be proportional
- 24 -
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to the proportion of time the planes spend in the "danger" state k
namely r  . More specifically,the mean number of emergency demands in
a day will be proportional to the number of flight hours spent in state
k by the fleet, namely N(vT/N)rk . Since k components with failure
rate a are subject to failure under this circumstance, the mean number
of emergency demands in one day is
v = vTrkak
Thus, letting PE be the matrix of transition probabilities,
Pij = p ly N=j I YE=i}
= P{emergency demand i-j}
0	 j > i
= e y yi-j
	
(i-j)!	 j < i
3.8 P  : Y  -} Y 
The transitions in the spares pool during the time interval from
night to the next morning are assumed due to replacements made on the
plane (or planes) visiting the main base for their scheduled overnight
maintenance. Let PN be the matrix of transition probabilities of deple-
tion of the spares pool by one such visitor. If there is more than one
visitor then this transition is iterated once for each visitor and
j	 (PN)v : y  -^- YM
	 The number of spares taken from the spares pool depends
upon the number requested, n - Z(T) . Thus as in 3.2, there exists a de-
pendence between Y and Z . As before, we shall assume that the depen-
dence can be uncoupled in the steady; state,
r^	 N_	 E
Pij L Z (T) =z	 P{Y J I Y i , z(T) z}
	1 ,	 if j-i - fs(n-z,i)
- 0
	 otherwise
t	 25 -
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and if the probabilities of Z(T) in the steady state are
qTz = P{Z(T)=z}
then steady-state transitions are approximately
P 	 = P{YM=j I YE=i}ij
_	 P 	 T
z ij lZ(T)=zqz
3.9 Joint Probability Laws for Z and Y
In Sections 3.1 through 3,8 only marginal distributions of Y and
Z are presented. Any dependence between Y and Z was assumed to be
weak enough that any joint probabilistic behavior could be approximated
by mixing over the marginals; for example, the transitions in 3.2 of Z
depend on Y so the conditional transitions were mixed, weighted by the
distribution of Y when the system (airline operation) is in steady state.
Analysis in 3.8 is similar. This approach of attempting to uncouple Y
and Z in this manner is quite unconventional and some justification for
it must be given.
In contrast to this tentative "uncoupling" approach, we now pre-
sent the exact probability laws for a fleet of N aircraft flying an N-day
route pattern, i.e., one visitor per night at the main base. A schematic
of the stochastic behavior of this system from one morning until the next
morning is presented in Figure 5. Referring, to that figure, note the fol-
lowing: On a given day the planes are numbered 1,2,...,N , corresponding
to the day of the route pattern the plane is on; for example, Z i equals
the number of functioning components in the k-out-of-n subsystem on the
plane which is starting the first day of the route, i.e.,, the plane that
has just completed its scheduled overnight at the main base. There are
t,i flight hours in the ith day of the route pattern. The transition of
the spares pool from evening to night, YE -}Y , is actually a deterministic
3.
r
rt	 '
n
Ci
'	 Morning Evening Ni ht Next Morning
Time
YM. >	 YE 7 'YN MY
^pp!'
` `	
17
Zl
t1^	 (Z,Gl) 
'/ Zi
L
/,`^ Zi
Z2 — 2	 (Z2, G2) Z2 !	 Z2
v
i	 Z12
/t
^N	 (Z' GN) / ZN 3
/	 •
Z
Figure 5.--Schematic of exact transitions for fleet of N planes flying
an N day cycle. Arrows signify transitions; broken arrows indicate joint
probability effect in transitions.
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N
transition: YN = YE -
	
	 G 	 The broken arrows in Figure 5 denote thei=1
fact that Y 	 also depends on the Gi's ; also Z^ = Zi 1)i=1,2,...,N .
The transition of the spares pool between evening and the next morning
are joint with Z  , in particular (YN, ZN) , -}	(YM, Zi) isg iven by
YM = YN _ x , Zi = ZN+ x , where x = fs (n-ZN, Y ) this transition
is also deterministic. Finally 
ZMi+1 ZNi , i=1,2,..,,N-1	 The only
stochastic transitions occur during the time interval from morning until
evening; the transition probabilities for these are given in 3.6 and 3.3.
The remaining transitions are deterministic as described above.
4. Steady-state Behavior of the ,Airline System
The goal of this study is to determine long-run average costs of
maintaining the k-out-of-n systems on the fleet of aircraft over the life-
time of the fleet, approximately 20 years. We shall assume that the system
reaches a steady state quickly relative to this 20-year length of time, and
therefore the long-run average behavior of the system starting from new
can be accurately approximated using steady-state probabilities Thus these
probabilities must be obtained. This section is devoted to some approximate
or tentative approaches to this problem. Future work will include more
thorough investigation of these and other possible approaches.
4.1 Uncoupling Y and Z
i
t	 One possible approach to solving for steady-state probabilities is
►
 l;	 to assume that the dependence between Y and Z can be uncoupled. More
specifically, when the system is in steady state we assume that for Z
transitions, which are conditional upon the state of Y , it sufficesto
use the weighted sum of these conditional transition probabilities, weighted
by the steady-state marginal distribution of Y ; and vice versa for Y
transitions. Such weighted sums occur in the transition matrices QT and
N
P	 in 3.2 and 3. 8, respectively.
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The uncoupled analysis is shown in Figure 6. The Z process is
analyzed separately from Y ; it only uses a steady-state distribution
of YN as an input. Let pN(i) = PTY N=il be a steady-state distribution
of Y 	 For purposes of deriving the steady-state distribution of Z it
is assumed that p  is given and fixed independently of the stochastic
behavior of Z ; the transition matrix QT
 is actually a function of p  .
T	 T NQ = Q (p) 	 Section 3.2. If the steady-state probabilities of Z(0)
and Z(T) are q0 and q  , respectively,
q0(z) = P{Z(0)=z}
qT (z) = P{Z(T)=z}
then they must satisfy
q  = g0Q0
q0
	gTQT(PN)
Thus in order to obtain steady-state probabilities of the Z process, we
first must supply a steady-state distribution for Y  and then solve the
system of equations (4.1.1). Quantities of interest arising from the Z
process (see Figure 6) are emergency demand and routine demand for spares.
As discussed in Section 4.4, the emergency demand when the system is in
steady state may be approximately a Poisson process with rate proportional
to rk	 Routine demand equals n - Z(T) and therefore its distribution
is obtained from qT for the system in steady state.
The Y process requires steady-state distribution of emergency and
k	 routine demands for spares as input. Therefore assume that the emergency
demands form a Poisson process with rate v As in the previous paragraph,
it is assumed that this input process is independent of Y . The transition
matrix PE actually depends on v , PE = PE (v) , see Section 3.7. Next we
assume that the demand process for routine replacement of failed parts is
i1
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a sequence of independent demands Di,D 2,... , where the steady- state
distribution is
P{Di d} = qT(n-d)
Thus the transition matrix P  actually depends on q 	
PN = PN(gT)
see Section 3.8. If the steady-state probabilities of YN YE and
YN
 are p  , p  , and p  , respectively,
PM(Y) = p{YM y}
pE (y)	 Pty E=y}
PN(Y) = P{YN=y}
then they must satisfy
PE	
PMPM
p 	 = pEPE (v)
	
(4.1.2)
PM = PNPN(g T) .
Thus,in order to obtain steady-state probabilities for the Y process,it
is necessary to provide steady-state distributions of spares demand.
The above analysis of the Z process corresponds to the upper half
of Figure 6. It is assumed that the input_ processes are given and controlled
so that behavior of the Z process creates no feedback which can affect the
distribution of these inputs. Similarly, the above analysisof the Y pro-
cess assumes no feedback to the input process. These analyses of the pro-
cesses separately as described are valid however, now we suggest the ques-
tionable technique of analyzing them simultaneously with the above methods.
In particular the output of Z becomes the input of Y and vice versa,
creating a feedback loop that violates the previous assumptions. It is
hoped that in some cases of interest this will not be a serious violation
and approximate steady-state probabilities can be obtained.
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Combining the
system of equations:
T
q
0
q
T
r 
E
p
N
p
M
p
V
oeparate analyses of Z and Y gives the following
g0QO
gTQT (p N)
I rk'z q0(z)
z
pMPM	 (4 1.3)
= pEPE(v)
pNpN(gT)
TrTXk .
This system can probably be solved iteratively, or perhaps by using a
matrix inversion computer algorithm.
The uncoupled analysis described in this section is intended as
an approximation. It is highly unlikely that it will produce exact steady-
state probabilities for any system of interest. The approximation might be
good in "light traffic," i.e., excess spares or repair facilities. It also
might be a good approximation in the case where the mean repair time is
much shorter than D the number of days in one cycle of the route structure;
this case would tend to have little dependence between the size of the spares
pool at a particular time and the number of spares requested by an overnight
visitor at the main base.
Future work will include a closer look at the above technique. In
;Appendix B a simple example with some numerical results is presented which
illustrates the fact that the above uncoupling technique may give incorrect
answers.
4.2 Partial Uncoupling of Y and Z
The uncoupled analysis in Section 4.1 amounts, in some sense, to
ignoring the joint distributions of the different components of the
32
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vector-valued process and just allowing marginal distributions to enter
into the analysis. In Figure 6 the only information allowed to cross the
interface (the dotted line in Figure 6) between the Y and Z processes
are the marginal distributions. We can extend this idea of uncoupling by
allowing more but not all information to cross the interface, in particu-
lar some of the joint probabilities between Y and Z , but not all.
This idea is only in the formative stages and is not precise. The follow-
ing example may help.
ry
Let YM , YE , YE , Z(0) , Z(T) , and Rk be defined as in previous
sections. Define the following joint transitions of (Y,Z) . In the
morning-to-evening time period (Y M, Z(0)) -*,(YE , Z(T), G) , according to
the transitions given in 3.3 and 3.6. In the evening-to-night period,
(YE , Z(T), G) -> (Y N, Z(T)) , where Y  = YE G , a deterministic transition.
Finally in the night-to-morning period we have the transition (Y N, Z(T)) ->
(YM ,
 
Z(Q)) , where YM = YN - x and Z(0) = Z(T) + x , x being
f6 (n- Z(T), Y 
N )
	 The three transition matrices can be multiplied to give
the transition of M-(Y , Z(0)) from one morning to the next, and then steady-
state joint probabilities can be solved for from the eigenvector equation.
We note that, while the uncoupling in 4.1 ignored dependence and thus
may have removed some of the interaction and reduced some of the fluctua-
tions in the behavior of the system, the analysis in this section may have
the opposite effect, thus providing an approximation with higher operating
cost than the one in 4.1, which may have a lower operating cost. The reason
for increased fluctuations is the fact that the above analysis is equivalent
to making one plane fly the whole N-day route in one day instead of having'
N planes staggered out on the route. Having all the emergency failures of
a plane charged on the day it is dispatched from the main base aggravates
any shortage in the spares pool; if the pool was low the plane was dis-
patched in less than perfect condition, thus stochastically increasing the
number of emergency failures the plane will suffer in the next N days.
If these failures are all charged to the spares pool on the first day, it
_33 _
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rill increase the chance of a stockout over the case of charging them
,n the day they occur because the repair shop will have less time to
catch up on its work.
Another possible treatment of the interface between the 5 and
Z processes would be to allow only information on the total number of
bad units among those in planes and in spares to cross the interface,
then to assume a statistical distribution of the number of bad in each
plane and at the base, conditional on the total number of bad units in
the entire system.
4.3 Sparse Matrix Techniques
Consider the transitions of (Y,Z1 , ... ,ZN) described in Section 3.9.
The state space of this process will be huge. As an example, consider the
United 747 fleet of 18 aircraft with CSDL microprocessor aboard; this has
10 CPU's. Suppose that 6 (2 triads) must be functioning for dispatch,
giving a 6-out-of-10 system; suppose there are 10 spares; then ignoring
backorders, the state space consists of (10+1)(10-6+1) 18 = 4.2 x 1013
points. Any straightforward Markov analysis is clearly infeasible; however,
as is pointed out in Section 3.9, there are actually a much, much lower
number of transitions within this huge state space than can occur in general.
r
This suggests an analysis using sparse matrix techniques. The example in
Appendix B should be amenable to such an approach; see the end of Appendix B.
A recent reference is [12].
4.4 Monte Carla Simulation
}
	
	 In spite of the size of the state space it is probably feasible to
perform a Monte Carlo simulation of the sP	 stem in Section 3.9. This isY
because stochastic transitions of individual components are independent of
each other and all joint transitions, are deterministic. Another fact
favoring success of a-Monte Carlo approach is that we are interested only
in a subset of marginal probabilities and a subset of expected values to
be used as inputs in the cost equations (see Sections 5 and 6). The first
i
_i 34 -
" R^`^?4
	
_ ^
	 t,....•.,._	 ...........^,.`
	
__..__.. ^,_
	
_^.1^. } '	 .,.,: _....,.w--.a.' 	 iw^k+rawrnr.•,roeeMMlrti
TH-66502
fact suggests that implementation is tractable; the second that run times
until reaching equilibrium of quantities of interest will be of manage-
able length.
It will be of interest to run a Monte Carlo simulation starting
with a perfect new system and to note the length of time required for
the system to reach equilibrium,	 If the equivalent real operating time is
a 10 years or so (a significant part of the lifetime of the system), this
obviates the need for a steady-state analysis of the system.
	 In that
r.
case, transie7 Uls must be considered.
p
Fiwl ly, Monte Carlo simulation of the exact system (in Section
I' 3.9) can be used to evaluate the accuracy of the approximate solution tech-
niques proposed in Sections 4.1 and 4.2.	 If the accuracy is questionable,
it might be efficient to use the approximate solution techniques to obtain
initial vectors for a Monte Carlo simulation. 	 Conversely, if the approxi-
mate solution probability vector is used as an initial vector in the simula-
tion and after several iterations the marginal probabilities have not
changed appreciably, this constitutes verification of the approximate
solution approach.
5.	 Interface with Reliability and Cost Models
In Sections 2 through 4 the underlying stochastic behavior of a fleet
of aircraft with 	 k-out-of-n	 subsystems is described along with proposed
methods of analysis. 	 This underlying stochastic behavior generates events
that have consequences in the realm of reliability penalty costs and
maintenance penalty costs. 	 we distinguish between these two penalty situa-
tions as follows.	 A maintenance penalty event consists of dispatch cancel-
j lations or delay of a plane due to the 	 k-out-of-n	 system dropping below
k	 functioning units on the previous flight leg and inability of line main-
tenance men to replace failed component(s) prior to the next dispatch time.
A reliability penalty event occurs when a plane is dispatched on a flight
leg with	 k	 or more units functioning at dispatch time but during the
course of the flight something happens which prevents the aircraft from
completing the flight according to flight plan.	 Reliability penalty events
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include abortions, diversions, delayed arrivals, excess fuel consumption,
crashes, etc. The penalties incurred will depend upon where in the route
pattern the particular event occurs. To compute the average penalty costs
incurred by operating the airline in steady state during a time interval,
we shall compute a weighted average of average cost per penalty event
occurring at each point of the route pattern, weighted by the expected.
number of events at that point during the time interval.
5.1 The Route Schedule and Penalty Costs
The route pattern of a D-day, T-hour route-can be described
by a 4 x m array in which m equals the number of legs in one cycle
through the route:
a1 a2 a3 	 am
d1	d2	d3	...
	
dm
t 	 t2	 t3	 .	 tm'
gl
	
9 2
	93 	..	 gm
where a.1 	the ith city visited, d. the day of the D-day cycle,3.
ti the accumulated number of flight hours when landing at the ith city,
and g  the amount of ground time at the ith city. For example, consider
the route depicted in Figure 1. A possible route schedule for this situa-
tion is:
2	 3	 4	 5	 3	 6	 7	 2	 8	 7	 8	 1
1	 1	 1	 2	 2	 2	 2	 3	 3	 3	 4	 4
2.0
	 4.5	 6.0	 7.3	 8.3 11.3 12.9 16.0 19.7 21.2 22.7 25.7 i
1.0	 2.5 14.5	 .9	 1.5	 2.0 12.7	 2.0	 1.7 12.0	 3.5 16.0 p
Labelling the main base as City #1, in the above array we have 3 legs on
the first day of the 4-day cycle: 1 -> 2, 2 -> 3, 3 + 4, with cumulative
flight time equal to 6.0 hours. The second day starts with a leg 4 -> 5 , etc.
Now we wish to assign costs to reliability and maintenance nenalty
ems.+
3
r"
}
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be a function of where the event occurs in the route. First consider
maintenance penalty events; the only such event is an emergency failure,
i.e., the k-out-of-n subsystem dropping below k functionin g components.
As an example, suppose an emergency failure occurs at cumulative flight
hour 10.0 in the above route schedule; this means that during the second
day on the leg from City #3 to City #6 the k-out-of-n subsystem drops
to k-1 functioning components. It is assumed that the dispatch minimum
level of k working components is conservative and that the plane
can complete the flight leg as planned with only k-1 units; however,
a failed unit must be replaced at City #6 before the plane can be dis-
patched on the next leg of the route. We assume that all spare units
are inventoried at the main base and thus a replacement must be flown
out to City #6; furthermore, if City #6 is a secondary base, a maintenance
man must be sent to make the replacement. Time required to get the spare
and make the replacement may exceed the 2-hour ground time at City #6,
interfering with dispatch of the next leg, 6 -} 7 . Consequently this leg
may be cancelled or delayed. If it is cancelled the cost may be computed
as proportional to the length multiplied by the size of the plane; depending
upon the amount of airline information available it should, in principle,
be possible to compute the cost to any desired precision. Delay costs can
also be calculated from airline experience. If a spare is available from
the main base inventory the problem should be fixed in time for the plane
to get back on schedule to start day #3. If the last leg of day "2 is
cancelled, a ferrying cost will be incurred in getting the plane from City
#6 to City X12. All the penalty costs resulting from an emergency failure
on the sixth legs i.e., 3 -} 6 , are deterministic and in theory can be
calculated to give a cost C6
	Likewise similar costs can be computed
for an emergency failure on any leg. This information can then be used to
give the penalty cost resulting from an emergency failure at time t
flight hours; denote it C E (t)	 A possible example of CE (t) for the
above 4-day route schedule Is plotted in Figure 7. The steady-state
expected cumulative number of emergency demands in (O,t] is calculated
in Section 3.5: m(t) = B(G(t)) 	 Therefore the average cost due to emer-
.gency failures on one plane in [0,T] for an airline operating in steady
- 37 -
.j
Fj
.k^
CE(t)
<1
^	 w
,t
r
t
_
t time
2.0 	 4.5	 6.0 7.3
	 11.3
	 16.0	 19.7 22.7
	
25.7
	 (flight
4. 8.3	 12.9
	 21.2 time)
L
Figure 7.--Average
	 	 penalty costs for emergency failures as a
function of their times of occurrence.
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state is a weighted sum of the costs, weighted by the expected number of
times each cost is incurred. Let C E
 equal this average cost; then
T
CE = l C (t)dm(t) .
0
Now consider the reliability penalties incurred by a plane flying
a scheduled route. A reliability penalty event can be any of several
possibilities, each with a different penalty cost; thus we shall assume
we know the expected reliability penalty cost incurred when a plane is
dispatched on the ith leg of the route schedule with z components in the
k-out-of-n subsystem working correctly. Denote this quantity as CR(z,i) .
Let qi (z) equal the steady-state probability of the subsystem having z
good units at time ti-1
	
Then the expected penalty costs charged to
reliability in the course of a plane flying the route for an airline in
steady state is
m n _
CR
 -
	
	 CR(z,i)gi(z) .
i=1 z=k
The probability vector q 1
 is calculated from q0
 using the techniques
of Section 3.1. The expected cost function C  is related to work sup-
ported by a National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) grant
with the University of Michigan (John Meyer, Principal Investigator);
thus we shall not pursue it here.
Any further discussion of reliability is beyond the scope of this
memorandum. However, there is a rather compelling reason for not consider-
ing it in this preliminary effort at a cost model: namely, if the 10-9
reliability con3traint is met, it is very difficult to imagine such a
control system causing great economic penalties due to unreliability.
Consider that the chances of loss of control are 10 -9
.
 in a 10-hour
flight; thus approximately 10-1 0
 in a 1-hour flight. If we take the
i	 extremely conservative view that 1 in 100,000 cases of reliability failure
- 
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events will involve loss of control that still implies at most 10-5
probability of some sort of reliability problem in 1 hour. For a fleet
of 100 planes operating 10 hours per day, 365 days per year, this results
in 3.65 expected , reliabilty penalty events each year. The expected
number of cases involving loss of control will be 3.65 x 10-5
	 The
economic impact of such rare events will be small in the average day-to-
day costs of running the plane. The extremely rare catastrophic event
can be incorporated by simply estimating the cost per event and multi-
plying by the expected frequency, e.g., $100,000,000 x 3.65 x 10 5
$3650 , and adding this figure to the annual cost. (The abovereasoning
is rather imprecise, but it should justify ignoring the economic impact
of reliability penalty costs for now; we shall assume that k is fixed
at a level for which the 109 probability constraint is met.)
5.2 Buffer Spares Pools at Additional Airports
j One of the simplifying assumptions in the model in this paper is
the existence of a single solitary spares pool located at the main base.
It is assumed that when a plane's k-out-of-n
	 system drops below	 k	 good
components away from the main base that a spare is flown out to it from
the main base.
	 In actual airline operations some spares are also distributed
[ at certain primary bases in addition to the main 'base.
	 In this section we
show how to incorporate such a feature into the model of Sections 2 and 3
without complicating the analysis of the underlying stochastic behavior.
This approach is intended to apply to very small spares pools at only a
very limited number of additional airports.
	 In effect these additional
spares pools will act as buffers for emergency spare demand.
	 If a plane
is grounded at an airport with a buffer spares_ pool, a spare is used from
that pool to replace a failed component (which is assumed returned to the
repair shop by the next morning), then _a demand is placed to the main base
for a spare to restock the buffer pool.
	 This demand is treated as an emer-
gency demand by the main base and filled within one day if spares are
available; if no spares are available at the main base, a backorder is re-
i corded (the	 Y	 process goes negative). 	 There is no transshipmentbetween-
i
i
fiL
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buffer spares pools. The spares in a buffer pool are used only for
emergency replacements at the airport where the buffer pool is located.
The only modification required in the model will be in the cost terms
for penalty for stockout of the spares pool at the main base and delay
cost. Most of the backorders arising from demands for spares from air-
ports with buffer spares pools will not reflect a true emergency (a
grounded plane with no spare available), but simply a shortage in the
buffer pool. Thus the penalty for stockout of the main spares pool must
be decreased by a factor proportional to the percentage of demands which
do not reflect true emergencies. Thus we must compute the fraction of
demands which come from an airport with a buffer pool when there is no
plane waiting for a spare.
To illustrate the above situation, consider an airline route with
one buffer spares pool consisting of at most one spare at a primary base.
Presumably this will be a base with relatively heavy traffic. For example,
in Figure 1 of Section 2, we shall put a buffer spares pool of size one
at City V. For an airline flying this route according to the schedule
in Section 5.1 in-steady state, the expected number of emergency demands
placed by a plane at City #7 equals dm(t) integrated over flight legs
dt
7 and 10,
m7
	
m(12.9) -m(11.3)) + (m(21.2) -m(19.7))
If there are N planes flying a D-day schedule then the total expected
demand at City #7 will be m 7 N/D = M7 * Since the buffer pool will be
placed at an airport with a lot of traffic it is assumed that the daily
emergency demand for spares can come from many planes; it is therefore
reasonable to assume that the demand has a Poisson distribution with mean
daily demand M7 * It takes one day to restock the buffer ' pool, thus
we need the proportion of demands which find a spare present. This is a
case of Palm's theorem [6]; it will equal the probability that no demand
was made in the last 24-hour period. If the demand is Poisson with mean
M7
 per day, then the distribution of time since last demand (LD) is
P{LD > D = exp(-M7)
Thus proportion exp(-M 7) of the demands arriving at the main spares
pool from City #7 are not really emergencies and no penalty should be
incurred for failure to fill them immediately. These constitute pro-
portion
P* = M7exp (-M7 ) / (N/D) m(T)
of the total expected demand on the spares pool at the main base. In
Section 6, the term for the penalty for stockout of the main base spares
pool should be decreased by a factor.of p* . Also, the penalty for an
emergency failure at the airport with the spares buffer must be reduced,
since less delay is involved in proportion exp(-M 7 ) of the cases.
6. Cost Equations
The average quantities derived from the stochastic behavior of the
y
maintenance operation and costs associated with them can now be combined
with other costs to form a fairly general model of the cost of acquiring
	 ra
and maintaining the system and its backup for a fleet of aircraft.`
-^F
We first consider fixed initial costs. The initial purchase cost of 	 °<
units plus spares is
C	 N(C	 + C n) + C s
P	 P,C	 P'l	 p,2
The cost of setting up the repair shop is
9
Cs	 Cs^O + Cs^lr
i	
.
Certification and training costs for repairmen and line maintenance men is
Cc = Cc C + Cc l  + Cc 2 	 primary airports) 	 ~
The total initial cost will be	
x
C	 C p + C s + C c
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Next consider fixed continuing costs. The shop overhead is
CO = CO30 + CO'lr .
The salaries of repairmen are
r
	 i
H
Cr = r Cr ^ l
The retraining/recertification cost of repairmen is
Ct = Ct'O + Ct'lr .
The overhead cost of the line maintenance center at the main base and the
line maintenance centers at other bases which are charged to this sub -
system are
Cm
 = Cm'O + Cm' 1 (# primary) + Cm , 2 (# secondary)
The annual fixed costs ,,^re the sum
C  = CO +Cr +Ct +Cm .
The present value of fixed costs when the system is new is
Y-1Cf
 = C  + I (1-d) nCf ,
n=0
where d is the annual discount factor and y is the lifetime of the
r
system in years.
Finally, we consider the costs which are incurred daily in a random
fashion during the life of the system due to the underlying stochastic
nature of the system. The expected daily cost of emergency groundings
{	 for the fleet (due to repair and lost revenue) is
{	 CE	 (N/D)CE
i	 where CE is defined in Section 5.1. The expected daily cost due to
k	 f h	 1	 i 1
	
d	 fstoc out o t e spares poo is equ va ent to one ay o lost service
	
#
{	 for each item short for a day. If the average stockout is
	 #
-1,
	
_	 _	
cc
1	
NSO	 E QYEI >	 G ipit
i=-N	
}
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and Rd is the average daily revenue per plane, then the expected daily
penalty for stockout is
	
Cso	 NSORd .
(If a buffer spares pool consisting of one unit is added to the system
as described in Section 5.2, then the following modifications must be
	
made to the cost equations: CS O
 = (1-p*)CSO 	CE must be adjusted to
reflect lower grounding penalties at the airport with buffer. If Cb,0
is the expected daily penalty at this airport without a spare available
and Cb,l is the penalty if a spare is always immediately available, then
the expected daily savings by having the buffer is 0 = exp(-M 7 ) Cb,l +
	
(1 - exp(-M7))Cb 0 and -CE* = CE 	 Cb 1 and Cb 0- can be computed
as described in Section 5.1. 'Finally, the cost of the extra spare must
	
be added to CP , C*	 p*	 C + Cp,2 .)
Line maintenance charges at the main base may be a linear function
j
of the average number of bad units and the average number of replacements
made on each aircraft visiting on a scheduled overnight stop. The average
number of bad units on a plane is
n1	
B= n- EZ(T)	 n- L zqZ
z=k
The average number of units replaced on a plane is
R = E(Z (0)) - E (Z(T)) _	 zq0 -	 zqZ
	
z=k	 z=k
Thus the daily expected line maintenance cost is
CLM	 CLM' 0 + CLMJvB + CLM, 2vR .
There may be some feature where repairmen in the shop can work on other
things if they are not busy repairing components for this particular system.
t
The expected number of idle repairmen is
i
{
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(r-i)p S
M
-i
r=O
and the credit for each is C W , creating an expected credit
C IR ^ -WI
The daily expected costs due to stochastic behavior is
CST
	
CE  + C so + C 
LM 
C IR
The total cost is
Y-1
C	 C + C + I (1-d)'365Ci	 f	 STn=O
There are undoubtedly other sources of cost but the above should include
many of the major ones. (One thing we have ignored is the possibility of
periodic--say, every 10,000 hours--extensive ground testing for latent
faults.)
A
7. Conclusions
It is premature to make any definitive concluding remarks about
the model and analysis discussed in this memorandum because the research
is still in progress. However, we shall summarize some of the assumptions
made in the model, all of which turn out to be of a conservative nature,
and outline some future work.
7.1 Conservatism of the Model
There are numerous instances where the model only approximates
the behavior of an actual airline maintenance operation as it exists in
the real world. In these cases we have chosen the approximation so that
it tends to overestimate the cost (or number of failures, etc.), thereby
giving a lower bound on performance of the system for particular values
of the control variables; that is, in the real world we are assured of
doing as well or better. Some instances of these conservative approxima-
tions are:
45
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(a) Only minimal emergency repair is allowed when the system
drops below k functioning components away from the main
base.
(b) There is only one spares pool (located at the main base).
(c) The spares strategy is special; a more general one might re-
sult in lower operating costs,
(d) Only one line maintenance center is allowed to do routine
replacement.
(e) The system is required to complete all T flight hours
even if some legs are cancelled, thus exposing the system
to more time on test than it gets in the real world and thus
increasing the chance of failures.
(f) There is no flexibility in the repair shop such as overtime
work in order to reduce stockout.
(g) It is assumed that an entire day is lost if the replacement
demand by a grounded plane is not met because of stockout.
(h) It is assumed that all units of the
	 k-out-of-n	 subsystem
have the same failure rate as a component in use, even a,
though some components may be in a standby configuration.
(i) If the number of functioning units drops from
	 k	 to	 k-2 )
during one flight leg, the event is counted as two groun3ings
and costed as such in the cost equations.
j	 (j)- There is no dispatch flexibility; for example, airlines tend
to .allow a plane with
	 k-1ood units to be dispatched tog	 P
^
the main base.	 We do not.
There is at least one nonconservative aspect to our model; we ignore
the possibility of component failures on the ground or in the stockroom
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7.2 Future Work
(a) An attempt will be made to solve the model with realistic
parameter values numerically on the computer.
(b) Some theoretical work will focus on justification for inter-
facing stochastic processes in the way presented here, e;g.,
Sections 4.1 and 4.2.
(c) Some optimization will be attempted. The control variables
are n , r . s , h , and 6 . Economic feasibility of an
optimal solution will be examined.
(d) If we get computer output for a sufficient number of different
parameter values, we shall do some sensitivity analysis and
possibly eliminate some of the model's complexity. One
approach is Repro-modeling [9].
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APPENDIX A
A Simplified Trade-off Example
In this section we describe several variations of a flight control
system and perform a greatly simplified economic analysis of the mainte-
nance of each system to illustrate trade-offs between redundancy and per-
formance.
Suppose that in order for a control system to control the aircraft
it requires a minimum of 6 processors, 6 memories, 2 buses, 2 each of
sensors A, B, and C, and 2 each of actuators 1, 2, 3, and 4. If the
control system consists of this minimum set of components then a single
failure causes loss of control. We shall assume that memories and processors
have mean times between failures (YUBF's) of 10,000 hours and all the other
components have MTBF's of 100,000 hours. We shall denote the above system as
Min control (6, 6, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2) .
Now consider dispatchability. We use the requirement that the
probability of loss of control in a 10-hour flight cannot exceed 10-9
Using elementary calculations involving binomial probabilities we compute
Pfdrop to 5 or fewer processors in 10 hrs I start with 81
5	 3
	
(1)(1 _ 10-3) ( 10
 
-3 )3
	 56 x 10- 9 > 10 9
Pfdrop to 1 or fewer buses in 10 hrs I start with 31
4
r
E	 ^ (1
3)(1 - 10-1) 1 (10-1)'	 30 x 10-9 > 10 9
Thus if the control system consists of only 8 processors and memories and
3 each of buses, each sensor and each actuator, it cannot be dispatched. 	 k;;
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Control System	 Penalty/Flight Hour (x 1000)
Min
	 8(4 x 10- 5) + 2'9 x 10-4)
	
= 2.12 x 10-3dispatch
CSI	8(4 x 10-5 ) + 2'2.25 x 10-5) = 3.65 x 10-4
CSII	 8'5 x 10-8) + 2'9 x 10-4) 	 = 1.80 x 10-3
i
CSIII	 8'5 x 10-8 ) + 2(2.25  x 10-5) = 4.54 x 10-5
Now consider the repair costs per flight hour. Let us assume
that the average repair cost of a memory or a processor is $1,000 and the
average repair cost for a bus, sensor, or actuator is $500. A 4-out-of-4
system with MTBF 105
 for each component has failures at the rate of
4 x 10-5
 per flight hour, a 4-out-of-5 system has failures at approxi-
mately the rate of 5 x 10 5 per flight hour. A 9-out-of-9 system with
MTBF 104
 for each component has failures at the rate of 9 x 10 -4 per
flight hour; a 9-out-of-10 system has failures at approximately the rate
of 10 x 10 4 per flight hour. Thus the average expected repair costs per
flight hour for the different systems is:
Control System Repair Cost/Flight Hour ( x 1000)
Min 8(4 x 10-5 ) x .5 + 2 9 x 10-4) x 1 =	 1.96 x 10 3dispatch
CS 8^4 x 10 5 ) x .5 + 210 x 10-4 ) x 1 =	 2.16 x 10-3
1
CS x 10-5 ) x .5 + 2(9 x 10-4) x 1 =	 2.00 x 10-3
`	 CSIII 8(5  x 10- 5 ) x .5 + 2(10  x 10-4) x 1 =	 2.20 x 10-3
i
i
Adding the above costs (grounding plus repair) gives the cost of maintenance
per flight hour.
r
f
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Control System Maintenance Cost /Flight Hour ($)
Min dispatch	 4.08
CSI
	2.53
CSII 	3.80
CSIII	
2.21
The last system is clearly cheaper to maintain,but it will be the most
expensive. Assume that an extra memory and processor costs $5,000 and
that adding an extra bus, 3 extra sensors, and 4 extra actuators costs
$10,000. Then the extra cost is
".	 Control System Additional Cost
s
^Y	 Min	 0dispatch 
t?	 CSI	 5,000
	
CSII 	10,000
CSIII	 15,000
If the additional cost is spread over 12 years with 10 flight hours per day
(43,800 flight hours) these additional costs become
$.114	 $.228	 and	 $.342
per flight hour for CS I . CS III and CS III, respectively. These costs
mcsL be paid initially and thus it might be more accurate to amortize the
r	 initial investment over the 12-year period assuming an 8% interest rate-.
In this case the additional cost per flight hour is increased by a factor
r	 .08	
1.59
1
	
 n	 12
	
(1+1r)
	
11 -' . 08
and the values become
$.182	 $.364	 and	 $.546
- 54 _-
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per flight hour for CSI, CSII , and CSIII , respectively.
Now consider the total difference in costs for the four systems
(maintenance cost per flight hour plus initial investment per f-ight
hour).
Control System
	
	
A Cost/Flight Hour
Amortized Not Amortized
Nin dispatch	 4.08	 4.08
CS I	2.71	 2.64
9_II
CS 11	 4.16	 4.03
CS 111	 2.76	 2.55
Thus CSI is optimal if we consider the cost of financing or of having
money invested in equipment; CS III is optimal if we ignore this factor.
This illustrates how accounting procedures could have a significant effect.
The above example is meant only for illustrative purposes. The
analysis is too simple to be successful with a real control system.
ril  i i.
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APPENDIX B
Uncoupling and Sparse Matrices: An Example
A simple specific example of a stochastic process is presented which
{	 may lend itself to approximate uncoupled analyses and also to sparse ma-
trix techniques. It is intended to be used as an example for developingr
methodologies in the above areas.
Consider a bivariate continuous-time process {X(t), Y(t), t > 01
the process is Markovian. Let n be an integer time point. In the inter-
val [n, n+l) the transitions of X and Y are independent of each other.
Here X is a pure-death process on [n, n+l) with state space {0,1,2,...,b}
y and X can be thought of in connection with a b component system: X(t)
number of functioning units in the system at time t The transition in-
tensities for X are
P{X(t+At) = i-1 f X(t) = i} = iaAt
for n < t < t+At < n+l ; i=1,2,...,a ; 0 is an absorbing state during
[n, n+1)
1	 a:
Similarly let Y be a pure-birth process on [n, n+l) with state
space {0,1,2, ..,c} . Here Y can be thought of as the number of compo-
nents in a spares pool. If the repair shop that fixed the failed components
from the X-proc.,-ss has c repairmen, then the transition intensities ofY are
l
M	 P{Y(t+At) = i+l 4 Y(t) = i} - (c-i)IlAt ,	 1
!	 for n < t < t+At < n+l ; i=01,2,...,c .
At integer time points the system whose state is described by the
X-process is repaired by replacing failed components with good components
from the spares pool. This transition is completely deterministic..
C
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(X(n- ), Y(n-)) '' ' X(n), Y(n))
where
X(n) = X(n ) + r , Y(n) = Y(n) - r
and
r = min 'b - X(n-), Y(n- )) .
The process (X,Y) incorporates some of the features of the more
general processes in which we are interested and thus may be a useful ex-
ample for studying the possibilities of uncoupled analysis. We consider
a special case (b=l, c=1) to show that uncoupled analysis gives incorrect
answers. In future work it may be possible to determine the approximate
size of the error introduced by this approach in more general situations.
Consider the special case of (X,Y) with X = 0 or 1 and Y
0 or 1
	 At integer time the process can be in one of four states,
(0,0) , (0,1) , (1,0) , or (1,1) . Suppose that during one unit of time
a good unit in the system described by X has probability p of failing
and a unit in the repair shop has probability q of being repaired.
Then in the interval [n, n+l) the .following transition probabilities
hold:
s
P{X(n+1 ) =0 X(n)=11 = p
P{X(n+1 ) =1 ( X(n) =1} = 1-p
P{X(n+1 ) =0 ( X(n) =01 = 1
P{X(n+1 ) =1 X(n) =0} p
and	 f
P{Y(n+l ) =0 Y(n)=1} 0
f	 P{Y(n+l ) =1 Y(n)=11 = l
"	 P{Y(n+l )=0 Y(n)=0}
	
1-q
k	
P{Y(n+l )=1 Y (n)=O} = q .
The joint transition matrix for (X(n), Y(n) to X n+l
I:
#	 - 57 -
I^
J
TM-66502
1-q	 q	 0	 0
	
0	 1	 0	 0
p (1-q )	 pq	 (1-p)(1-q )	 (1-p)q
	
0	 p	 0	 1-p
The joint transition matrix for (X(n- ), Y(n- )) to (X(n), Y(n)) is
1 0 0 0
0 0 1 0
{	 Q_0	 0 l	 0 w
0 0 0 1
r
The joint transition matrix for (X(n), Y(n)) to (X(n+l), Y(n+l)) is
	
1-q	 0	 q	 0
0	 0	 1	 0
PQ
p(1-q)	 0	 p q+(1-p ) (1-q )	 ( 1-'p ) q
	a
0	 0	 p	 1-p
i
The steady-state probability vector for the process{(X(n), Y(n)), f
n=0,1,2,...} is the solution of
y
r = rPQ .
For the special case p = .1 and q
	 .5 , the steady-state joint dis-
tribution of (X(n), Y(n)) is
t
	
P{X(n)=0, Y(n)=0}
	 56
P{X(n)=0, Y(n)=1} = 0
P{X(n) =1, Y(n)=0} = 101	 56
P{X(n)=1, Y(n)=1} = 5.6
i
If an "uncoupled" analysis is performed in order to approximate
the marginal steady-state probabilities of X and Y (an analysis similar
to that described in 4.1), the following is obtained. Let
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p
x
 = P{X(n)=1} , 1- p
x
 = P{X(n)=0}
py = P{Y(n)=1} ,	 1 - py = P{Y(n)=0}
be the notation for marginal probabilities in steady state. The condi-
tional transition probabilities for X(n) to X(n+l) are
P{X(n+l)=0 X(n) =1, Y(n) =01 = p(1-q)
P{X(n+l) =0 X(n)=1, Y(n)=1} = 0 ,
and so on; thus, when mixing using the assumed steady-state distribution
of Y(n) we get the "unconditional" transition probabilities
P{X(n+l)=0 X(n) =1} = (1-py)p(1-q) + py•0
P{X(n+l) =1 X(n) =1}	 (1-py)[(1-p)+pgl + py•l
P{X(n+l)=0 X(n)=01 = (1-py)(1-q) + py•0
P{X(n+l)=1 I X(n)=01 .= (1-py)q + py•1
Similar "unconditional" steady-state transition probabilities can be
computed for Y ;
P{Y(n+l)=0 Y(n)=11 = (1-p x)l + px•p
P{Y(n+l) =1 Y(n)=1} = (1-px)0 -+• px(1-p)
P{Y(n+l)=0 Y (n)=01 = (1-pX)1 + px[1-q+pg]
P{Y(n+l)=1 , Y(n) =01 = (1-pX)0 + px [(1-p) g J	
€!
For the special case p .1 and q = 5 , these transition values become
.5	 .5 p	 .5 +_.5y 	 pyy.	
RX —
.05 - ` .05py	.95 + .05py
1 - . 45pX	 .45px	 i.
RY
1- .9pX
 .9px
{
59 -
R
I
1Cr
C	 '
TM-66502
for the marginal X process and Y process, respectively. The steady-
state probability vectors were thought to satisfy
(1-px9 px) = (1
-px31 Px)-X
(1-py , p y ) = (1-py , py)RY
Solving the above system gives
-4 + A-4-0
•8022Py =	 18	 =
P
Px = 9 14-p= .9891 .
y
The exact marginals for steady-state behavior are
P(Y(n)=1)	 41 = .8036
P(X(n)=1) 
= 56	 .9821 .
The accuracy of the approximation raises a glimmer of hope that the un-
coupling technique may be useful.
The process (X,Y) may also be a useful example for investigating
the application of sparse matrix techniques to solving for steady-state
distributions. Note that the state space of the process has cardinality
(b+l)(c+l) . A straightforward analysis would involve solving a system
of (b+l)(c+l) linear equations in (b+l)(c+l) unknowns: a tedious task
for moderate values of b and c , an impossible task for large values
of b and c . However, recalling the underlying stochastic behavior
of the system, recall that there are (b+l)(b+2)/2 possible transitions
of X(n) to X(n+l ) and (c+l)(c+2)/2 possible transitions of Y(n)
to Y(n+l ) and that these transitions are independent of each other
and therefore joint probabilities contain no more information than the
marginals. The transition of (X(n-), Y(n-)) to (X(n), Y(n)) is deter-
ministic and thus consists of (b+l)(c+l) bits of information. Thus the
transition probabilities of (X(n), Y(n)) to (X(n+l), Y(n+l)) actually
are generated by
w	 1 ^
F
s	 d
i
T*-"502
I' (b+l)( b+2) + (c+l)(c+2) + (b+l) (c+l) _	 (c+b+2 )(c+b+3)
I	 r
" values, which is much smaller than the number of entries in the transition
r, matrix,R
2YS [ (b+l) (c+l) ]	 .
Y
. For example, if	 b = c	 10 , we are comparing 253 with 14641.	 It seems
- plausible that some sparse matrix techniques might be used to ea-ploit
Ia
this characteristic.
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